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PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
Richard W. Perkins (2567) 
Attorney for Appellant 
343 South 4th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-6808 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA S. RETHERFORD, : 
Appellant, : 
vs. : DOCKETING STATEMENT 
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE : (Subject to Assignment 
MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.; to the Court of Appeals) 
CATHY BATESON; LOUISE : 
JOHNSON; VICKIE RANDALL; 
DOE I THROUGH DOE X, : Case No. 890464 
Respondents. : 
Appellant Debra S. Retherford, pursuant to Rule 9 of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, submits the following Docketing 
Statement in the above-entitled matter. 
1. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
Appeal pursuant to the provisions of 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953, as amended), and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
2. This is an Appeal from a final Order entered in the 
Third Judicial District Court in Civil No. 890902183CV, on 
October 10, 1989. 
3. The Order sought to be reviewed was entered on the 10th 
day of October, 1989, and the Notice of Appeal was filed on 
October 25, 1989. 
4. A true and correct copy of the Order from which this 
Appeal is taken is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". A true and 
correct copy of the Notice of Appeal is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"BM. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
5. Appellant was initially employed as a telephone 
operator by Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company in 
Grant Junction, Colorado, during April, 1976. 
6. During February, 1983, pursuant to the nationwide 
divestiture of AT&T, Appellant transferred to the "Wasatch 
Office" of AT&T, located in Salt Lake City, Utah, where Appellant 
continued her employment with AT&T as a telephone operator. 
7. Subsequent to Appellant's transfer to the Wasatch 
Office, Appellant became aware that sexually-offensive comments, 
jokes and physical contact were common-place at the Wasatch 
Office. 
8. Shortly after Appellant's transfer to the Wasatch 
Office, Appellant was contacted by her Manager Fayonne Johanneson 
for the purpose of discussing the employees' Code of Conduct which 
had been published by AT&T. During such conversation, Appellant 
was required to sign an entry in her work records indicating that 
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she had discussed and understood the contents of the Code of 
Conduct. Such procedure was repeated on a yearly basis, with 
Appellant discussing said Code of Conduct with whoever was her 
manager at the time. While certain minor revisions to the Code of 
Conduct were made from year to year, upon information and belief, 
the provisions concerning sexual harassment and retaliation, and 
designating the EEO Coordinator's Office as an appropriate griev-
ance procedure, remained the same throughout Appellant's employ-
ment with AT&T. Upon further information and belief, all 
telephone operators of AT&T were required to review and endorse 
the Code of Conduct on a yearly basis as a condition of their 
continued employment with AT&T. 
9. During approximately April, 1983, Appellant overheard 
a male employee of the Wasatch Office state to another male 
employee words to the effect of, "I'm bisexual, what are you?" 
10. During approximately July, 1983, Respondent Johnson 
was overheard by Appellant and, upon information and belief, by 
several other employees of the Wasatch Office, loudly describing 
in explicit detail, a sexual encounter that she had allegedly had 
with a male employee of the Wasatch Office. 
11. Commencing approximately June of 1983, Appellant began 
to be subjected to unwanted and offensive advances from Jolene 
Gailey (hereinafter referred to as Gailey), who was at all times 
material hereto an employee of Defendant AT&T at the Wasatch 
Office, which included comments by Gailey concerning Appellant's 
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physical appearance, suggestions that Appellant join Gailey in 
various activities, and physical touching. 
12. At approximately the same time as the commencement 
of Gailey1s conduct toward Appellant referred to in the preceding 
paragraph, certain other employees of the Wasatch Office, includ-
ing Respondent Johnson, who were, upon information and belief, 
personal firends of Gailey, began to congregate around Appellant 
with regularity. Such employees frequently and regularly con-
versed explicitly upon subjects of a sexual and/or homosexual 
nature. 
13. On or about November 22, 1984, Gailey, who was visibly 
intoxicated at the time, sat next to Appellant at work and stated 
words to the effect of "I'm going to save you from Dave Todd." 
On this occasion, Gailey placed her hand upon Appellant's arm 
in an affectionate manner, which greatly offended Appellant. 
14. Subsequent to November 22, 1983, the aforementioned 
pattern of conduct perpetrated upon Appellant by Gailey became 
more aggressive, to the point where, during approximately December 
of 1984, Gailey asked Appellant to pose nude while Gailey prepared 
a picture or sculpture. 
15. Shortly following the incident referred to in the pre-
ceding paragraph, Gailey, on a separate occasion, told Appellant 
that she (Gailey) needed to find a roommate, and that she hated 
men and even the sound of men's voices on the telephone. When 
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Appellant did not respond to these statements by Gailey, Gailey 
grabbed Appellants arm and said words to the effect of, "Debi, 
why don't you talk to me?" 
16. During approximately December, 1983, Appellant was 
telephoned at her residence by Gailey. Upon information and 
belief, said telephone call was made by Gailey from the Wasatch 
Office during her working hours. 
17. During approximately January, 1984, a male employee of 
the Wasatch Office passed a note to Appellant, which note stated 
that Appellant was having an affair with a certain other male 
employee. Upon information and belief, Gailey was the originator 
of the allegation contained within said note. 
18. During approximately March, 1984, Gailey telephoned 
Appellant at Appellant's residence and asked Appellant if she 
intended to file an EEOC Complaint against Gailey. Such inquiry 
was made by Gailey, upon information and belief, pursuant to 
instructions of Respondent Bateson-Hough. Appellant responded 
to this inquiry of Gailey by stating that Appellant would file an 
EEOC Complaint if Gailey continued to bother Appellant. Appellant 
further informed Gailey during this conversation that Appellant 
had been offended by Gailey*s asking Appellant to pose nude. 
Gailey stated in response to Appellant's comments words to the 
effect of, "I'm sorry if I offended yo, but I feel I shouldn't 
apologize for my sexuality." 
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19. Subsequent to the telephone conversation referred to 
in the preceding paragraph, Gailey and certain other employees 
of the Wasatch Office, including the individuals named herein as 
Respondents, commenced upon a regular practice of retaliatory 
harassment of Appellant, which included, inter alia, staring at, 
and making threatening facial expressions at Appellant, walking 
extremely close to Appellant, following Appellant, and talking 
about Appellant amongst themselves. On one occasion during 
approximately March, 1984, Appellant became so upset by this 
conduct that she was required to leave work early. 
20. During approximately March, 1984, Appellant, on two 
separate occasions, complained verbally to Supervisor Hilda 
Shelley, and Manager Al Reynolds, concerning the pattern of 
harassment referred to in the preceding paragraph. 
21. On or about May 8, 1984, Gailey assumed a position 
immediately next to Appellant on the stand-up computer boards 
at a time when many other positions were available. Appellant 
immediately moved to another position. Within approximately 10 
minutes thereafter, Gailey moved to a different position. 
22. On or about May 9, 1984, Appellant wrote and delivered 
to Bateson-Hough a letter stating that Gailey had continued harass 
ing Appellant in spite of Appellant's requests to Gailey that she 
not do so. 
23. On or about May 10, 1984, appellant submitted a 
written complaint to the office of the EEO Coordinator for AT&T. 
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24. On or about May 15, 1984, Appellant received a tele-
phone call at her residence from Richard Salazar, who was at that 
time, upon information and belief, an employee of AT&T and a Union 
Steward of CWA. During the ensuing telephone conversation, 
Salazar stated to Appellant words to the effect of, "You're the 
new kid on the block — you're not going to win this. We don't 
know you very well, but we do know Jolene, she is a respectable 
person in the community and an artist" and "Somebody could get 
fired over this." 
25. On or about May 31, 1984, at approximately 1:15 a.m., 
Gailey drove her vehicle at a high rate of speed past Appellant 
while Appellant was attempting to cross the street to her vehicle. 
Gailey then proceeded to follow Appellant south on 1-15 to the 
13th South exit. 
26. During June, 1984, the EEO Coordinator's Office for 
AT&T, per Linda Johnston, who was at that time, upon information 
and belief, a personal friend of Bateson-Hough, conducted an invest 
tigation into Appellant's written complaint filed on or about 
May 10, 1984. Said investigation, upon information and belief, 
consisted wholly of personal interviews of Appellant and Gailey, 
and the submission of written statements by Appellant and Gailey. 
27. During approximately June, 1984, Appellant partici-
pated in a conversation with Darlene Anderson, who was at that 
time, upon information and belief, a first-level manager at the 
Wasatch Office. Said conversation included a discussion of 
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Appellant's problems with Gailey, in regard to which Anderson 
stated to Appellant words to the effect of, "Just be careful what 
you say and do; this is a strong and big group that you are deal-
ing with." 
28. On or about July 10, 1984, the EEO Coordinator's 
Office for AT&T, per Linda Johnston, submitted its report and 
recommendation in regard to Appellant's written complaint of 
May 10, 1984. Said report recommended Appellant and Gailey have 
as little contact with each other as possible in the future. 
29. During approximately July, 1984, following the issu-
ance of the report by the EEO Coordinator for AT&T, Appellant 
received a telephone call from Reta Pehrson, who was, upon 
information and belief, at that time a supervisor for AT&T and 
Vice President of Telephone Operators for CWA. During this 
conversation, Pehrson stated to Plaintiff words to the effect 
of "You have to be satisfied with the EEO's decision" and "If 
anybody asks you about it, don't tell them and don't say any-
thing." Pehrson also stated words to the effect of, "Cathy 
wanted me to also tell you that if you would like a transfer, 
she will transfer you to the Sundance Office." 
30. During approximately July, 1984, Appellant overheard 
an employee of the Wasatch Office, who was at that time engaged 
in a conversation with two other employees, including Respondent 
Johnson, state words to the effect of, "Debi would make a good 
stripper — she has big boobs." Immediately following said 
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statement, Respondent Johnson stated, while looking directly at 
Appellant, words to the effect of, "My bra size is 34B." 
31. Subsequent to the issuance of the EEO Coordinator's 
report on or about July 10, 1984, Gailey and certain other 
employees of the Wasatch office, continued to stare at and make 
hostile facial expressions toward Appellant, to follow Appellant, 
to walk and sit close to Appellant, and to talk about Appellant 
amongst themselves. On one occasion during approximately August, 
1984, an employee of the Wasatch Office, stated to Appellant words 
to the effect of, "Debi, they're all staring at you." 
32. On or about August 9, 1984, Appellant witnessed a 
female employee of the Wasatch Office grab Respondent Johnson's 
crotch from behind. Upon information and belief, Johnson was 
employed as a supervisor at the Wasatch Office at the time of 
this incident. 
33. On or about August 30, 1984, Appellant filed a charge 
letter with the EEOC, alleging, in summary, that Appellant had 
been harassed by some of her co-workers during the preceding year, 
and that AT&T Management had done nothing to remedy that problem, 
despite frequent complaints by Appellant. 
34. During approximately November, 1984, Appellant 
received a telephone call at her residence from Alfred A. Aros, 
who was at that time, upon information and belief, an investigator 
for the EEOC. During the ensuing telephone conversation, Aros 
stated to Appellant that three of the four witnesses whom Aros 
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had interviewed concerning Appellant's allegations of harassment, 
had indicated that there was a "lesbian problem" at the Wasatch 
Office. Aros further advised Appellant that he intended to issue 
a warning to AT&T Management concerning said "lesbian problem". 
35. During approximately November of 1984, the Office 
of the EEO Coordinator for AT&T administered a survey to the 
employees of the Wasatch Office. On the same day, the Coordin-
ator's Office provided a lecture and film concerning sexual 
harassment in the work place to the employees of the Wasatch 
Office. 
36. On or about December 29, 1984, Gailey and Respon-
dent Johnson, together with one other employee of the Wasatch 
Office, engaged in a conversation within hearing of Appellant. 
During said conversation, Appellant and Gailey made eye contact, 
whereupon Gailey stated to Appellant words to the effect of "What 
are you staring at? Will you stop staring at me." Gailey then 
stated to Johnson words to the effect of, "She keeps staring at 
me." Johnson then looked directly at Appellant and stated words 
to the effect of, "She must think we look like dead dogs." 
Upon information and belief, later that same evening, Gailey 
stated to Manager Susan Stedman, words to the effect of, "Debi 
will be upset about what I said." 
37. On or about December 30, 1984, Appellant wrote and 
delivered to Respondent Bateson-Hough a written complaint, in 
which Appellant set forth the incident described in the preceding 
paragraph. 
_ i A _ 
38. During January, 1985, Bateson-Hough called Appellant 
into her office and informed Appellant that Bateson-Hough had 
forwarded Appellant's written complaint of December 30, 1984, to 
the EEO Coordinator's Office, and had received from the EEO Coor-
dinator's Office in response thereto, a letter which allegedly 
reprimanded Appellant for her repeated complaints concerning 
Gailey. Bateson-Hough then stated to Appellant that Appellant 
was on warning of dismissal as of that date, said warning to 
become part of Appellant's permanent employment record, and that 
if Appellant continued to complain about Gailey, Appellant would 
be terminated. Bateson-Hough refused to allow Appellant to review 
the alleged letter from the EEO Coordinator's Office, or to allow 
Appellant to review her personnel record. 
39. On the same day and immediately prior to Appellant's 
having been placed on warning of dismissal by Bateson-Hough 
during January of 1985, as referred to within the preceding para-
graph, Appellant observed Bateson-Hough and Gailey conversing in 
a casual manner. Upon noticing Appellant, Gailey made a smug 
facial expression towards Appellant. 
40. Following Appellant's conversation with Bateson-Hough, 
described in the preceding paragraph, Respondents and other 
employees of the Wasatch Office, continued to harass and intimi-
date Appellant by staring at and making hostile facial expressions 
toward Appellant, by sitting and walking near Appellant, and by 
talking about Appellant amongst themselves. 
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41. On February 22, 1985, Appellant filed a civil action 
in the United States District Court for the State of Utah, Central 
Division, Civil No. 85-189W, which alleged violations of Title 
VII and 42 USC Sec. 1983. On June 11, 1985, said Complaint was 
dismissed by Order of the Court, per Honorable David K. Winder, 
due to Appellant's failure to respond to AT&T's Motion to Dismiss 
filed April 9, 1985. 
42. During approximately March, 1985, meetings were held 
by various managers of the Wasatch Office with each of the 
employees of the Wasatch Office, in groups of two or three 
employees at a time, for the purpose of discussing the results 
of the survey which had been taken by the EEO Coordinator's Office 
during approximately November, 1984. During Appellant's meeting 
with Manager Fayone Johannason, Appellant was informed by Johan-
nason that the survey had concluded that there was a great deal of 
discussion about sexual matters, including a prevalence of obscene 
jokes and remarks at the Wasatch Office. Johannason also indica-
ted on this occasion that employees of the Wasatch Office should 
bring such incidents to the attention of management, rather than 
allowing such incidents to remain unreported. 
43. Following the issuance of the EEO Coordinator's report 
on the results of the survey which was administered during Novem-
ber of 1984, incidents of obscene jokes and explicit sexual 
conversations increased in frequency and offensiveness. 
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44. During approximately March, 1985, Appellant overheard 
a conversation wherein Respondent Johnson was speaking loudly with 
another female employee. During said conversation, Johnson stated 
to the other employee words to the effect of, "I'm really horny, 
I'm going to go finger myself." In response to this comment by 
Johnson, the other employee stated words to the effect of, "If 
you need any help, I'll be right next door." 
45. During approximately March of 1985, Appellant, while 
working at her station, overheard several employees of the Wasatch 
Office, including Johnson, discussing in detail their past alleged 
sexual experiences, including homosexual experiences, and includ-
ing detailed descriptions of sexual organs and various sexual acti 
vities. Said discussion transpired over a period of approximately 
30 minutes. 
46. During approximately April, 1985, Appellant, acting in 
her capacity as Union Steward, received several complaints from 
employees of the Wasatch Office, to the effect that they had seen 
Respondent Johnson put her hand down the blouse of another female 
employee during work hours. 
47. During approximately May, 1985, Bateson-Hough insti-
tuted a policy whereby some computers would be used solely for 
handling slow calls, while other computers would handle only fast 
calls. Operators handling the slow computers would inevitably 
have a lower productivity than other operators. According to 
- 13 -
Bateson-Hough's expressed policy, each operator should have spent 
equal time on the slow computers. However, upon information and 
belief, Appellant was required to spend far more than an equal 
share of time on the slow computers, with a consequent drop in 
productivity. 
48. On or about June 16, 1985, Appellant witnessed Respon-
dent Randall approach Respondent Johnson from behind, put her arms 
around Johnson, and kiss Johnson for a period of approximately 60 
seconds. Upon information and belief, Johnson was acting as 
supervisor of the Wasatch Office at the time of this incident. 
Later that same evening, Appellant overheard an employee of the 
Wasatch Office ask Johnson if she (i.e., the other employee) 
could eat a brownie while she was working on the computer board. 
(Upon information and belief, eating or drinking while working was 
contrary to AT&T policy). In response to said request, Johnson 
stated words to the effect of, "No, because there are some people 
who will tell on me. Isn't that right, Debi?" This statement was 
made while Johnson was looking directly at Appellant. Appellant 
suffered great emotional distress as a result of this incident and 
was required to leave work early. 
49. During approximately July, 1985, Appellant began to 
make regular visits to Jerry S. Gardner, a psychoanalyst, for the 
purpose of obtaining treatment for stress and anxiety which 
Appellant was suffering as a result of the retaliation and harass-
ment to which Appellant was subjected at the Wasatch Office. 
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50. On or about August 5, 1985, an employee of the Wasatch 
Office brought a book to work entitled "Joy of Sex". Said book 
was disseminated and discussed among various employees of the 
Wasatch Office, including Respondent Johnson, for a period of 
approximately one week. 
51. On or about August 8, 1985, Bateson-Hough, acting as 
Manager of the Wasatch Office, altered the seating arrangements of 
Wasatch Office employees, with the result that Appellant would 
have to sit next to persons who were participating in the retalia-
tory harassment of Appellant. 
52. On or about August 15, 1985, Appellant witnessed two 
female employees of the Wasatch Office lightly rubbing each 
other's arms while at work for a period of approximately several 
minutes. 
53. During approximately August, 1985, Appellant obtained 
a prescription from her physician, Nelson E. Wright, M.D., for 
Mellaril, for treatment of stress and anxiety that Appellant was 
experiencing as a result of the harassment to which she had been 
subjected at the Wasatch Office. 
54. On or about August 22, 1985, Gailey moved to a posi-
tion directly in front of Appellant and stated to appellant words 
to the effect of, "What are you looking for?" 
55. On or about August 24, 1985, Respondents Johnson and 
Randall moved to positions directly in front of Appellant. While 
working at such positions, Randall put her arm around Johnson and 
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stated to Johnson words to the effect of, "It's too bad we're 
being watched all the time." 
56. On or about September 7, 1985, Appellant took leave 
from work for medical disability, which disability consisted of 
severe psychological stress and anxiety resulting from Appellant's 
problems at the Wasatch Office. Said medical disability extended 
from September 7, 1985, to the date of Appellant's termination 
from AT&T on March 26, 1986. 
57. During November of 1985, Appellant was advised by her 
psychiatrist that Appellant would be permanently unable to return 
to work at the Wasatch Office. 
58. On or about March 12, 1986, Appellant received a tele-
phone call from Douglas Erickson, who was then Group Manager of 
the Wasatch Office. Respondent Randall was also on the line 
throughout the ensuing conversation. Erickson informed Appellant 
during this conversation that inasmuch as Appellant would be 
medically incapable of continuing her employment at the Wasatch 
Office, Appellant would be required to transfer for work to Boise, 
Idaho, such transfer to be effective within ten (10) days from the 
date thereof, in order for Appellant to retain her employment with 
AT&T. During this conversation, Appellant responded to Erickson's 
statement by informing Erickson that it would be impossible for 
Appellant to transfer upon such short notice inasmuch as Appellant 
was then undergoing psychiatric treatment in Salt Lake City for 
the injuries which she had sustained through AT&T's harassment 
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against Appellant and inasmuch as Appellant's minor daughter was 
attending school in Salt Lake City, Utah• In response to these 
statements by Appellant, Randall stated words to the effect of, 
"What do you expect us to do, build you a new building?" Erick-
son responded to Appellant's statements by informing Appellant 
that Appellant's failure to report for work in Boise, Idaho, 
within ten days would result in Appellant's termination from AT&T. 
59. On or about March 28, 1986, Appellant received a 
letter from Erickson dated March 26, 1986. In said letter, 
Erickson informed Appellant that inasmuch as Appellant had 
failed to report for work in Boise, Idaho, by March 23, 1986, 
appellant's employment with AT&T was terminated, effective 
March 26, 1986. 
60. On April 5, 1989, Appellant commenced the present 
action by filing a civil Complaint in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 890902183CV. 
Said Complaint alleged numerous claims under state law arising 
from Respondents' retaliatory harassment and discharge of Appel-
lant. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 1, 1989. On 
October 10, 1989, the District Court, per the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, entered its Order on Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, 
treating said Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss-
ing Appellant's Verified Complaint on all counts. 
- 17 -
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. ARE APPELLANT'S CLAIMS PRE-EMPTED BY THE EXCLUSIVE 
REMEDY PROVISION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SEC. 34-35-
7.1(11) (1953, AS AMENDED)? 
Respondents argued below that the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act pre-empts Appellant's common-law claims. 
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 34-35-7.1(11) provides: 
The procedures contained in this section and 
Section 34-35-8 are the exclusive remedy under 
state law for employment discrimination because 
of race, color, sex, age, religion, national 
origin, or handicap. 
Appellant submits that this provision specifically 
omits any reference to retaliation, thereby indicating that commons 
law claims arising from retaliatory discharge are not pre-empted. 
The Utah Legislature realized the distinction between retaliation 
and other forms of discrimination when it enacted the Anti-
Discrimination Act, as evidenced by their inclusion of a specific 
definition of "retaliate". Utah Code Annotated, Section 34-35-
2(15). 
Further, the Act consistently treats retaliation and 
discrimination as distinct concepts. Utah Code Annotated, Section 
34-35-6(1)(a)(i), (l)(e), (l)(f)(iii). Significantly, Title VII 
after which the Anti-Discrimination Act is patterned, specifically 
distinguishes between retaliation (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3) and 
other forms of discrimination (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2). Most 
importantly, the Utah Legislature has enacted multiple statutory 
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prohibitions against employer retaliation. Const. Utah, Art. Ill, 
Sec. 19 (Blacklisting); Utah Code Annotated, Sections 67-21-1, et 
seq., (Whistleblowers Protection); Utah Code Annotated, Section 
34-28-19 (Wage Claims); Utah Code Annotated, Section 34-22-12 
(Wage and Hour Disputes). Hence, the Anti-Discrimination Act was 
not intended to be the exclusive remedy for employer retaliation. 
II. ARE APPELLANT'S CLAIMS PRE-EMPTED BY GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION? 
Respondents argued below that, independent from the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, 
the Act should be construed as pre-empting all common-law claims 
arising in the context of employment discrimination pursuant to 
general principles of statutory construction. As the parties 
memoranda below indicated, the pre-emptive effect of state 
statutory remedies for employment discrimination where the statu-
tory provisions contain no express exclusive remedy clause is a 
much-disputed issue in recent employment law. Compare Makovi v. 
The Sherwin-Williams Company, 561 At.2d 179 (MD, 1989) (common-
law claims pre-empted); and McCool v. Park Royal Convalescent 
Center, 777 P.2d 1013 (Ore. App. 1989) (common-law claims not 
pre-empted). Appellant submits that this controversy is largely 
inapplicable in the present case because the Utah Anti-Discrimin-
ation Act specifically excludes retaliatory discharge from its 
exclusive remedy provision. The distinction made in the Utah 
Anti-Discrimination Act between retaliation and other forms of 
- 19 -
discrimination reflects the distinction between discrimination 
based upon status and retaliation for the exercise of a legal 
right, which has been recognized in other jurisdictions, Makovi, 
supra, at 184; Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 689 P.2d 1292, 
(Ore., 1984) (Linde, J. concurring). 
Assuming, arguendo, that it is necessary to apply 
general principles of statutory construction to determine the 
issue of pre-emption in the present case, Appellant submits that 
the opinions which have found no pre-emption are better reasoned 
and more sensitive to the problem of employment discrimination 
and the limited effectiveness of statutory remedies. For example, 
Rojo v. Kliger, 257 Cal.Rptr. 158 (Cal.App. 2 Dist., 1989). 
Further, there is no indication in the legislative history of 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act that the Act was intended as 
the exclusive remedy for retaliatory discharge. To the contrary, 
the Legislature has manifest its intent to provide multiple 
remedies for retaliation. 
III. IS APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE PRE-
EMPTED BY THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT? 
Respondents argued below that Utah should not recognize 
a common-law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy where a collective bargaining agreement provides a contrac-
tual remedy to the employee. This argument has been rejected by 
the majority of the courts which have considered it. For example, 
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Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir., 1981); Lepore 
v. Natl. Tool & Mfg. Co., 540 A.2d 1296 (NJ Sup. 1988). The pri-
mary reason for rejecting Respondents1 argument has been that 
state policy is independent and superior to any contractual 
arrangement of the parties. Moreover, it would be anomalous to 
provide a greater degree of protection to "at-will" employees 
than to employees under contract. In her majority opinion in 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, LTD, 104 UAR 4, 15 Note 10, Justice 
Durham implied that a cause of action for wrongful discharge 
would lie for both contractual and non-contractual employees. 
Further, the statutory prohibitions upon retaliatory discharge 
in the state of Utah apply equally to union and non-union 
employees. For example, Utah Code Annotated Section 34-35-6. 
IV. ARE APPELLANT'S CLAIMS PRE-EMPTED BY FEDERAL 
LABOR LAW? 
Respondents argued below that Appellant's claims are 
pre-empted by Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act 
(29 USC, Sec. 185), which has been recognized as providing the 
exclusive remedy for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. 
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 85 L Ed. 2d 206 
(1985). However only state law claims which are "inextricably 
intertwined" with an interpretation of a collective bargaining 
agreement are pre-empted. Allis-Chalmers, at 216. In general, 
state law claims for violation of public policy are not pre-
empted, because they derive from rights which are wholly 
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independent and distinct from the collective bargaining agreement.I 
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1877 (1988). 
On their face, Appellant's state law claims in this case have 
nothing to do with the Collective Bargaining Agreement. At the 
least, an issue of fact is presented. Lingle, at 1882. 
Appellant's Verified Complaint contains a claim for 
breach of implied contract. This claim arises from Respondent 
AT&T's "Code of Conduct" which Appellant was required to read and 
sign each year as a condition of her continued employment.. The 
Code of Conduct contains an express prohibition upon retaliation 
and discrimination. It also sets forth a procedure to remedy such 
retaliation or discrimination (AT&T's "EEO Office"), which is 
completely distinct from any remedy contained in the Collective 
Bargaining Agreement. Thus, Appellant submits that Respondents 
breached their independent contractual duty to Appellant under 
the Code of Conduct. The existence of a Collective Bargaining 
Agreement does not preclude the existence of an independent employ! 
ment contract for purposes of Sec. 301 pre-emption. Caterpillar, 
Inc., v. Williams, 96 L Ed.2d 318 (1987). 
V. ARE APPELLANT'S CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT RETENTION, BREACH 
OF IMPLIED CONTRACT, AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BARRED BY LIMITATIONS? 
The parties agreed below that the above-mentioned 
claims are subject to the four-year Statute of Limitations pro-
vided by Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-12-25(2). Respondents 
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asserted that because some of their tortious conduct occurred 
prior to the limitations period, those claims are barred by limita 
tions. However, it is clear from Appellant's Affidavit that most, 
if not all, of Respondents' tortious acts occurred within the 
limitations period. This issue is at least one of fact. 
VI. DID APPELLANT ALLEGE SUFFICIENT FACTS TO STATE A CLAIM 
FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS? 
Appellant submits that her Verified Complaint and 
Affidavit were more than sufficient to create an issue of fact 
upon this claim. 
VII. DID APPELLANT STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONDENTS FOR MALICIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT? 
Respondents raised two arguments below with respect to 
Appellant's claims for tortious interference: (1) With reference 
to Respondent Bateson-Hough, Respondents argued that as a manage-
ment employee, Bateson-Hough was a party to any employment con-
tract between Appellant and AT&T, and, therefore, could not 
interfere with the contract. (2) With reference to Respondents 
Johnson and Randall, Respondents argued that Appellant failed to 
state a claim because she did not allege that these Respondents 
"persuaded" or "conspired" with another to breach the contract 
which existed between Appellant and AT&T. 
Appellant submits that a management employee can be 
guilty of tortious interference where he or she acts out of purely 
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personal motives, such as malice. Zappa v. Seiver, 706 P.2d 440, 
(CA App. 1985); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 710 
P2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985). The existence of malice is an issue of 
fact. 
With respect to the non-management employees, Appellant 
submits that her Verified Complaint and Affidavit are sufficient 
to create an issue of fact as to whether these Respondents con-
spired with or persuaded another to breach their contract with 
Appellant. 
REASONS FOR SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
This Appeal should be decided by the Utah Supreme Court 
for the following reasons: 
1. No determinative Utah law exists concerning the scope 
of the public policy exception to at-will employment. 
2. No determinative Utah law exists concerning the 
applicability of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act's exclusive 
remedy provision to cases involving retaliatory discharge. 
3. No determinative Utah law exists concerning a manage-
ment employee's liability for malicious interference with 
contract. 
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AUTHORITIES 
The following authorities are believed by Appellant to 
be determinative of certain issues raised in this Appeal: 
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 34-35-1, et. seq. 
Berube v. Fashion Center LTD., 104 UAR 4 (1989); 
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 
108 S.Ct. 1877 (1988). 
DATED this 30th day of November, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
Richard W. Perkins 
Attorney for Appellant 
343 South 4th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Docketing Statement to Richard M. Hymas, Attorney for 
Respondents, at Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza, 60 East South 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147, postage prepaid, this 30th 
day of November, 1989. 
lywXa^,/ W' \t^JL^^— 
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Richard M. Hymas, USB No. 1612 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Suite 1100 
Eagle Gate Plaza & Office Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA S. RETHERFORD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 
MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.; 
CATHY BATESON; JOLENE GAILEY; 
LOUISE JOHNSON; VICKIE RANDALL; 
DOE I THROUGH DOE X, 
Defendants. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss having come before the Court 
for decision, and the Court having reviewed the memoranda and 
affidavits submitted by Plaintiff and Defendants, and the Court 
having determined that Defendants1 Mqtion to Dismiss should be 
treated as a motion for summary judgment; and the Court having 
found that there are no genuine issues of material fact; and the 
Court having further determined that Defendants are entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law; now, therefore, 
ORDER 
Civil No. 890902183CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
EXHIBIT "A1 
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants* Motion to Dismiss, which is 
being treated as a motion for summary judgment, is hereby 
granted. 
DATED this 10 day of Q^h^^_ ' 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
4-
Honor< 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this day of September, 1989, I 
served upon Plaintiff a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Richard W. Perkins, Esq. 
RICHARDS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
Richard W. Perkins (2567) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
343 South 4th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-6808 
jfa£eA«s@*4*t; 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA S. RETHERFORD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.; 
CATHY BATESON; LOUISE JOHNSON; 
VICKIE RANDALL; DOE I 
THROUGH DOE X, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 890902183CV 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
* * * * * * * * * 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff Debra S. Retherford, by and through 
her attorney of record, Richard W. Perkins, and hereby appeals to 
the Utah State Supreme Court the Order which was entered upon 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by the Third Judicial District j 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on October 10, 
1989. 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
DATED: October 25, 1989 lAJ,\f^*JU*h~ 
Richard W. Perkins 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
343 South 4th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
«o» <=XH!BIT "B! 
I hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of appeal to Richard M. Hymas, Attorney for 
Defendants, at Post Office Box 11808, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147, 
postage prepaid, this <^-5 day of October, 1989. 
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